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Cox, I. (2001) Role Call: A comparative study of the purpose and role of Station Commanders in England and in Denmark, dissertation for BCC: Moreton in Marsh: The Fire Service College, http://www.fitting-in.com/coxbcc.htm |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This
international study explores the role of the station commander. Fifty-six commanders, from two countries,
England and Denmark, were interviewed to ascertain what they believed to be
the purpose of their job, the problems they faced and the extent and
effectiveness of the support systems that were available to them. The respondents were also asked to prioritise
the different functions of their role, using the Station Command ‘Rolemap’ –
produced by the Implementation Working Group - as a template. In
addition forty-two of the interviewees also kept a two week ‘activity diary’
which collected details of the way they used their time: the hours they
worked, where they worked, the subjects they were working on and whether
their activities were planned or unplanned.
The details from these diaries were correlated with the findings of
the structured interviews to determine if there was a causal relationship
between the priority afforded to a function and the time spent on it. There
were only three significant difference’s between the countries. The Danish commanders had larger stations,
with larger budgets and spent considerably more time on ‘planning future
activities. There were no significant
differences between the English Brigades despite the range of size and type,
from metropolitan to rural. The
commanders placed a greater priority on ‘people’ centred activities -
personnel management, etc – than their organisations did. Conversely the respondents felt that their
Brigades placed a higher priority on technical issues – such as financial
management – than they did. One
of the key findings was the lack of clarity in defining the purpose of the
role of station commander. The
Brigades and the commanders had different views on the fundamental purpose of
the role. Coupled with this less than
half of the commanders had been given their job description, and only just
over half had received management training to prepare them for their role. The
information from the diaries indicated that the average commander works for
nine and a half hours a day and nine and a half days per fortnight. They spent 33% of their time working alone
and nearly 25% of their time was spent in administrative activities. Most of their tasks (86%) were planned or
routine and 25% of their activities were interrupted. These findings correlate well with earlier
management time studies. It was
notable that commanders spent only 2% of their time working in their
communities – indicating that commanders are not carrying the community fire
safety message to their communities in person. It
was apparent that station commanders were basing their actions on those of
their predecessors –thereby pursuing the aims of their forebears, not
necessarily those of the organisation.
There was also considerable role confusion, the commanders receiving
conflicting demands from different parts of their organisations. Two
recommendations are made. Firstly
that Brigades should ensure that there is a clarity of purpose, regarding the
role of the Brigade, that will inform and inspire everyone in the
organisation, particularly the line manager’s. Secondly that Brigades should consider the adoption of some
form of time measurement system for station commanders and other officers.
This must be done with care to avoid adding to the bureaucracy facing the
individual officer without benefiting the organisation. |
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Acknowledgements: This
research would not have been possible without the assistance and support of
many others. I would like to express
my gratitude to all who have helped me in it’s production: To
the Course Staff , especially Gibby Williams and Neville Walton for guidance
and advice and Dr Terry Shevels for steering me through the intricacies of
inferential statistics. To
my mentor Olaf Baars for his support To
the ‘test pilot’s who helped with the development of the research tools;
Nigel Blake, Richard Williams and George Cross. In
Denmark to Nils Lauridsen of Copenhagen Fire Brigade and to Torben Andreasson
of Odense Fire Brigade, for hosting me so well and for their patience with
all my questions. To
Dave Armstrong, Fire Service College; John Salt, Cheshire Fire & Rescue
Service; Victoria Cinirella, Home Office FEPD and Anton Bradburn, South Bank
University for their advice and assistance. To
my wife Jane for putting up with ‘the stranger in the study’ for six months. Finally
but most importantly, to all the respondents in the Brigades who answered my
questions and kept a diary for me – you remain anonymous but I thank you
all. Without you this would not have
been possible. |
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Chapter 1
1 INTRODUCTION
AND BACKGROUND
Précis: The
research objectives and parameters of the study are outlined. The social professional and legal pressures
that are inducing change in the fire service are described.
1.1 Research Subject
The subject of this research project, as described earlier, was chosen following an initial proposed hypothesis:
“That UK fire services line managers job descriptions do not equate with what they actually do. In particular they spend a large amount of time dealing with HR issues, more so than is reflected in their job descriptions or in comparison with other European countries”.
1.2 This hypothesis was based on concern expressed over the levels of stress related illness, disciplinary activities and complaints of harassment in the UK fire service. The implication being that an increasing amount of managerial time and effort was having to be devoted to such issues. However early exploration of the nature and extent of these concerns showed that the impact of these factors appears to be minor, (see Appendix I).
1.3 Early investigation of this hypothesis indicated that there was insufficient available evidence to prove the theory. Although job descriptions were obtainable, and the functions of managers have been described in a set of ‘rolemaps’– produced by the Implementation Working Group developing competency standards for the UK fire service (Standards Working Group, 1999). There was no evidence of what managers actually did to compare with these factors, nor was there any consistent definition of the purpose of the role. Therefore the focus of the study was changed and a set of research objectives designed to establish what it is that fire service line managers actually do.
1.4 The research objectives
set were:
i To
test the perception of the purpose and functions of the role of Station
Commander according to a) the organisations and b) the postholders.
ii To
quantify the key problems facing Station Commanders.
iii To
establish the nature and extent of managerial support available to Station
Commanders.
iv To identify how Station Commanders use their time at work.
The focus of this research was to establish what station commanders spend their time doing, and whether or not this correlated with the purpose of their role.
1.5 The project had to be bounded as it would not be feasible to study the activities of all fire service line managers. The role of Station Commander was chosen for the investigation as it was reasonably homogenous throughout, not only the UK, but also other European fire services. It also had other advantages; there is a published ‘rolemap’ detailing the nationally agreed elements of the job . Station commanders have a large impact on the fire service, they act as line managers for approximately 90% of wholetime uniformed personnel in most Brigades – figures derived from the Brigade Directory 2000, (DMG, 2000).
1.6
To determine
whether the factors affecting Station Commanders were unique to the UK a
comparative study was undertaken in Denmark.
This country was chosen as the legal framework, being an EU member, was
identical, and other factors were broadly similar – comparable culture,
(Hofstede, 1980) with local authority fire services and a high proportion of
English speakers.
1.7 The
focus of the research was an examination of the purpose and role of station
commanders, what they do, how they do it and, most importantly, to what end do
they do it.
1.8 The research consisted of two main parts: a
structured interview and a self –reporting diary. The job descriptions for the
role were also examined. The study was
based on a literature review of the factors affecting the organisational theory
and the time use patterns of those carrying out the role of station
commander.
1.9 The assumption was made that managers in the UK fire services have a more complex workplace to contend with than their predecessors. The changes can be placed under three main headings: Social, Professional and Legal, although the categories overlap.
1.10
SOCIAL
1.10.1 As Stredwick & Ellis (1998, 279) point out:
“Employees now have different expectations of work. Overall, they are better educated and aware of their rights, possess higher skill levels and are more inspirational than the previous generation.”
With increasing recognition being given to peoples rights (see below under ‘Legal’) a workforce is more likely to challenge management actions, and to demand evidence for any changes that are made.
1.10.2 Changes include increasing levels of stress (both professional and domestic), the increasing exercise of individual’s rights and changing lifestyle and work habits; all of which are affected by social changes.
1.11
PROFESSIONAL
1.11.1 The professional demands made upon managers are increasing. There is an expectation that all managers will contribute toward the strategic aims of the organisation. This was identified by Kanter (1991, 13 ) “Companies are asking …. staff and functional departments to play a more strategic role”.
Other changes include mentoring, competency assessments and appraisals (including 360o appraisal). The trend towards devolving budgetary control also adds to their workload. They also need a higher degree of computer literacy and have to cope with the increase in availability and accessibility that e-mail and mobile telephones provide.
1.11.2 It is a time of change for the fire service, as it is for the public sector in general. All organisations have to change to meet the demands of a changing environment. The public sector faces lower levels of competition than private sector, and many as ‘bodies corporate’ cannot ‘die-off’ and be replaced, as happens in commercial competition. The introduction of ‘Best Value’ (Home Office, 2000) as a legal duty on fire services is a mechanism that introduces an alternative to external competition to induce public sector organisations to adapt more rapidly. Best Value requires public sector organisations to challenge all of their service provision to determine if it should be supplied and also to consult the public to ascertain what services they want. In addition organisations must embrace competitive practices and compare their results with peer group to ‘prove’ Best Value.
1.11.3 The implications of these changes permeate every aspect of the service. Implicit in the concept of Best Value is the need for officers to challenge not only how a service is provided, but whether or not it should be supplied. A consequence of this is an increasing requirement to document and evidence all decisions made, and the reasoning behind them. The service is also becoming much more orientated to achieving results (outcomes) than to meeting standards. These pressures are defining the new professional standards of the service.
1.12 LEGAL
1.12.1 Managerial action is exposed to legal review to an ever increasing extent. Earnshaw & Cooper (1996, 27) remark that “it is now accepted that the duty of care takes effect as an implied term in the contract of employment.” Allied to this a legal precedent has been set (Thompson, et al .v. Smiths Shiprepairers, 1985), which states:
“a breach of duty consists of not only failing to take precautions known to be available as a means of
combating a known danger but also of not taking the initiative in seeking out knowledge of facts which are not themselves obvious.” (Author’s emphasis)
1.12.2 Ignorance is no excuse and managerial indolence no justification. Problems over harassment and equal opportunities, working time regulations, the environment, health and safety requirements, etc, are all issues which managers must recognise and address.
1.12.3 The recent Human Rights Act will strengthen the right of workers to seek redress for such issues. Klug (2000) argues that the Human Rights Act marks:
“the transition from a legal culture obsessed with the meaning of words to one which seeks the purpose of human rights values.”
In a similar vein Lord Bingham (2000, 7) notes that:
“the courts are required, so far as is possible to do so, to read and give effect to primary legislation and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention.”
1.12.4 All areas of employment, and operation, will be covered by this ‘read across’ provision, which will often place the burden of proof on the manager. It is therefore increasingly necessary for organisations, and the managers who run them, to have clear and consistent channels of command and communication so as to be able to demonstrate that whatever is done, is done properly and for a purpose.
Chapter 2
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Précis: The
literature on organisational development and managerial time use is
reviewed. The key themes found are the
‘contingency’ of management activities, that makes management such a complex
activity. Many variables affect managers but three key requirements stand out:
1.
the need for a sense
of ‘purpose’ and ‘shared vision’ to inform managerial decisions; and
2.
the need for
information on managers’ time use patterns, to optimise managers’ activities,
3.
the need to protect individuals from overwork and to
reduce the liability for the organisation.
2.1 Scope of The Literature Review
2.1.1 There are two main areas of research which are relevant to this study:
i The literature on organisational development. Specifically that which is concerned with what managers do; their role and their purpose in the organisation.
ii The corpus of work regarding time management and the use of managerial time.
2.1.2 The two are related, as managers’ effectiveness, how well they fulfil their purpose, depends upon the clarity with which their purpose is determined and their role is set Mere time efficiency is ineffectual if the work being done is not clearly focused toward achieving an organisation’s aims.
2.2
ORGANISATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
2.2.1 Although there is a large body of work on organisational theory the five elements and fourteen general principles of management expounded as early as 1916 by Henri Fayol are regarded by Pugh & Hickson (1996, 100) as “fundamental tenets” of the management of organisations. Fayol’s theory of the elements of management – that a manager must Plan, Organise, Co-ordinate, Command and Control, was one of the first theoretical analyses of managerial activity, and still underpins most current managerial practice.
2.2.2 Of Fayol’s fourteen general principles three are of particular relevance to a study of fire service management:
§ Unity of Command: each worker should be responsible to one person.
§ Unity of Direction: activities should be co-ordinated within an overall Plan
§ Scalar chain: a hierarchy is necessary for unity of Direction
The lack of one or more of these principles particularly affects the fire service because of its hierarchical tradition.
2.2.3 Schein (1980) describes an organisation as :
“the planned co-ordination of activities of a number of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, … through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility.”
It is within the context of such a hierarchy that the role and purpose of Station Command must be examined.
2.2.4 Drucker (1977, 72) notes that
“management .. has three tasks to perform: to fulfil the specific purpose and mission of the organisation; to make work productive and the worker achieving; and to manage social impacts and responsibilities.”
Here again we see the term ‘purpose’. Managers are there for a purpose. However a manager “does many things that are not managing” (Drucker, 1954, 343). Both the job itself and the organisation to which the post belongs are part of a complex construct.
2.2.5 To understand such complexity, it must be examined using several tools or models. Any attempt to explain a management system using only one measure or model will be too simplistic. In order to compare organisations models must be used, as it is impractical to contrast two complete systems. But models in turn have their limitations – the use of several models – or methods of examination - will better approximate reality than the use of only one form of comparison.
2.2.6 First it should be established that such comparison is possible and meaningful. Nealey & Fiedler (1968, 318) examined 32 empirical studies of managerial work, they concluded that
“the literature on management attitudes and behaviour …leads to the overall impression that the similarities outweigh the differences.”
However they add two caveats to this view, firstly that “information involving management behaviour is very scarce”, secondly that “the literature almost certainly contains data.. influenced by response bias and observer bias.” This was found to be the case – there is limited information on management behaviour in the UK fire service and what can be found is largely subjective based on the respondents thoughts rather than empirical evidence (McCreesh, 1999).
2.2.7 That comparison is possible and useful, however flawed or biased, is demonstrated by Peters & Waterman (1982). They used the McKinsey ‘7S’ model to compare the performance of forty-three companies. In effect they were comparing the managerial performance of entire companies, and successful use of their findings by other organisations is further evidence that comparative analysis is meaningful. Their identification of the importance of ‘hands on value-driven management’ to the success of the companies they studied indicates the necessity of having a ‘purpose’ to inform management activity. Similarly their concept of ‘tight-loose’ control relies on a shared common purpose informing decision makers, rather than having a bureaucratic control system to impose centralised values
2.2.8 Morgan (1997) examines this complexity by the use of metaphor. He views organisations as (inter alia) machines; organisms; brains; cultures; political systems and psychic prisons. Whilst Morgan contends that all theory is metaphor he recognises (p5) that:
“We have to accept that any theory or perspective that we bring to the study of organisation and management, while capable of creating valuable insights is also incomplete, biased and potentially misleading.”
2.2.9 Morgan also notes (p169) that “the nature of any given job often combines contradictory elements that create various kinds of role conflict.” This role conflict is allied to the ‘role theory’ expounded by Katz & Kahn (1966). They define the role of a manager as the sum of the ‘role expectations’ that he or she is subject to. When these expectations diverge role conflict ensues.
2.2.10 As well as role conflict there is also ‘role ambiguity’, where individuals experience no internal conflict but where expectations differ between workers. Maier, et al (1959) compared the definitions of roles according to the views of ‘pairs’ of superior and subordinate managers. The agreement of their definitions was in the order of 35%. Each, manager and managed, had a clear concept of the role of the subordinate but in two thirds of the cases the mental concepts were different.
2.2.11 Similar to the idea of role theory is the ‘psychological contract’ of Schein (1985). This predicates that the role expectations of a manager will be influenced by unrecorded, often unrecognised, differences of expectation between the organisation and the individual. A manager has to deal with this on two levels: firstly regarding the psychological contract between themselves and the organisation, secondly as an agent of the organisation in fulfilling the psychological contracts of their staff.
2.2.12 Mintzberg, (1973, 102) referring to earlier work by Stewart (1967), Sayles (1964) and Campbell et al (1970), found that:
“We cannot conclude that ‘managers’ jobs differ greatly from one to another.”
2.2.13 Mintzberg (1973,101) formulated a ‘contingency theory’ of managerial work.
Environmental Variables:
characteristics of the industry and the organisation.
(1973)
Job Variables:
The level, extent and nature of the job, the degree of
responsibility/autonomy, etc. Person Variables: the personality, style and attributes of the
incumbent of the job. Situational Variables:
the temporal features of an individual task. Basic Managerial Role Requirements Basic Characteristics of Managerial Work
ONE MANAGER’S WORK
This model sees management work being contingent on four ‘nested’ variables: the environment, the job, the person and the situation. The actions of a manager at any given time is the result of the interaction of these four contingent variables. This theory is an attempt to model the complexities of managerial work in a way that is understandable but not overly simplistic.
2.2.14 Mintzberg breaks managerial activity down into ten roles, divided into three areas:
INTERPERSONAL ROLES Figurehead Leader Liaison DECISIONAL ROLES Entrepreneur Disturbance Handler Resource Allocator Negotiator INFORMATIONAL ROLES Monitor Disseminator Spokesman
After Mintzberg (1973)
2.2.15 In a later work (1990,170) Mintzberg reflected on this model and concluded that there are four fundamental misunderstandings regarding the role and purpose of a manager.
i That managers are reflective and systematic planners
ii That managers have no regular duties to perform
iii That senior managers work best with aggregated (depersonalised) information
iv That management is a ‘scientific profession’ which has rules of operation
2.2.16 He challenges each of the misunderstandings as coming from a false belief that management is purely a ‘cerebral’ activity. Although he does not dismiss the need for the cerebral part of management [which he links to Fayol’s system] he stresses the normally unrecognised ‘insightful’ element of management. This has to do with integrity, vision, ethics and emotions, rather than numbers, charts and deadlines. Contact with people is necessary to maintain these two sides of management in harmony.
2.2.17 More recently this approach has been adopted by proponents of the concept of ‘Emotional Intelligence’ (EI), such as Goleman (1998) and Hendrie (1998). Cooper (1998, 48) provides this definition:
“Emotional intelligence is the ability to sense, understand and effectively apply the power and acumen of emotions as a source of human energy, information, trust, creativity, connection and influence.”
2.2.18 Dulewicz (2000) sees strong links between E.I and transformational leadership, both require acknowledgement of more than just a mechanistic relationship between the individuals in an organisation.
2.2.19 Weightman (1999, 151) also differentiates between ‘transactional leaders’, who concentrate on command & control and the ‘give and take’ of daily managerial activity and ‘transformational leaders’ who are visionary and redefine the workplace.
She also (p.11) makes a similar distinction between what she terms ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ management approaches:
· managing activities } Hard
· managing resources } Approaches
· managing peoples feelings } Soft
· managing visions and values } Approaches
2.2.20 Hooper & Potter (1998) sum up the essence of transformational leadership:
“What really matters is the ability of the leader to unlock the potential of their people. This so-called transformational leadership is a far cry from the traditional command-and-control approach still taken in many organisations, even by those who deny doing so.”
2.2.21 Moss Kanter (1989, 361 – 365) outlines seven key skills which she holds that mangers must possess to thrive in an increasingly competitive world. [The comments indicate a subjective view of how well fire service managers conform to these skill sets.] Table 1
|
|
Skill |
Comment |
|
1 |
Reliance on self not status in hierarchy |
Fire service managers used to hierarchical structure |
|
2 |
Co-operative competition |
Shared aim of all Brigades’ |
|
3 |
Operate with high ethical standards |
High standards set in public sector? |
|
4 |
Develop humility in dealings |
More used to telling than listening? |
|
5 |
Develop a process focus |
Poor at detail work, ‘tell not sell’, etc. |
|
6 |
Multifaceted and cross-functional |
Used to compartmentalisation |
|
7 |
Reward results, not effort |
Culture of fixed conditions of service |
From Kanter RM (1989)
Point seven is of particular interest as the job descriptions acquired during the study are defined by task rather than by expectations of output or outcome. Even the Station Commanders rolemap (Standards Working Group, 1999), which does indicate desirable outcomes, has no quantitative performance criteria – although there is a clear expectation that such criteria should be set at Brigade level.
2.2.22 Point two is also worthy of note as the public sector possesses an inherent advantage in this area. Whereas a commercial organisation is often reluctant to share its technical and managerial discoveries; a public sector organisation can – indeed, ethically, it should. As Pedler and Aspinwall (1996), p116, put it: “..one of the higher goals of public service organisations is to contribute to public learning and knowledge.”
2.2.23 These key skills are far removed from the mechanistic approach taken by Taylor (1947) and subsequent writers of the ‘scientific’ school. There are two main differences between the Tayloristic approach and the style proposed by Kanter and others. Firstly, that the emotional, people centred aspects of management are critical to managerial success. Secondly that the managerial job is always in a condition of "flux and transformation" Morgan (1997, 251). The conclusion is that managers must learn to cope with continual change rather than try to impose a false permanence on the organisation.
2.2.24 Peter Senge (1992) is one of the foremost disciples of the need for an organisation and hence, of course, the people within it to continually adapt and learn. Senge’s ‘learning organisation’ is based on five key points:
Personal Mastery Where each individual accepts the need to continually update and improve their ‘mastery’ of their craft.
Mental Models Where restrictive mindsets, both group and individual are challenged and stretched.
Shared Visions Where all those in the organisation share a common vision of the future. This will lead to a ‘holographic’ organisation where each unit or person encapsulates the whole. This in turn leads to the ability to have a ‘tight-loose’ control system, where the individuals will act for the greater good with minimal supervision because they share a common purpose.
Team Learning Where the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Teams can usually accomplish more than individuals –providing they are working to a common aim.
Systems Thinking Where the ‘big picture’ allows managers to steer a better course for the long term, avoiding the pitfalls of the ‘urgent’ to deal with the ‘important’.
2.2.25 However for an organisation to develop, not just survive, it is essential –according to Senge (Ibid) - that it possesses two attributes.
i A sense of purpose, a calling or a vision, of something more than just continuing.
ii Sufficient humility to realistically appraise its own faults and to learn from all other quarters.
2.2.26 It is important to recognise that when one speaks of an organisation needing to have “a sense of purpose” or “sufficient humility”, it is the people within an organisation, especially the managers that must possess and exhibit these traits.
2.2.27 Handy (1993, 143) echoes the concept that Senge defined as ‘holographic’. In Handy’s view workers (including managers) respond to the influence of an organisation in one of three ways. They may COMPLY with what the organisation requires because their contract and other ‘controls’ ensure that they obey ‘the rules’; using sanctions to enforce compliance where necessary. If an individual IDENTIFIES with the proposed working practices and patterns there is little need for such enforcement. Ultimately the individual may INTERNALISE the aims and ethos of the organisation. At this time there is no need for any control measures, individuals will do what is best for the organisation, to the best of their abilities, in any situation. This is the equivalent of Senge’s ‘shared vision’ (which is also echoed in the McKinsey 7S model). The values of the organisation are running through the ‘internalised’ worker like the letters in a stick of rock.
2.2.28 As Peter Nolan (1999, 28) notes when discussing the concept of ‘ideal’ management systems
“The argument that the history of work simply records a succession of increasingly efficient systems is - although compelling - ultimately unconvincing.”
How then can the most appropriate answer be arrived at? When deciding what management systems and structure to adopt it must be remembered that there is no one right answer, but some answers are more effective for the organisation.
2.2.29 In commercial organisations the degree of success of a company is measured by its growth and profit margins. The success factors for public sector organisations such as fire services have been less well defined, but the introduction of national and local performance measures under Best Value (Home Office,2000) is beginning to exert the same external pressures on the public sector as shareholder expectations place on private companies.
2.2.30 This is leading to the development of performance measures for fire service managers: such as Cheshire Fire Service’s ‘Critical Success Factors’ (Salt, 2000), Hampshire Fire & Rescue Service’s ‘Station Commanders Action Plan’ (Bacon, 2000), West Midlands Fire Service’s ‘Organisational performance Methodology’ (Gardiner, 2000) and Royal Berkshire Fire & Rescue Service’s ‘PB Views’ programme (Ball, 2000). These, and other similar initiatives, are seeking to produce measures of success, so that good practice can be recognised, rewarded and replicated.
2.2.31 According to the contingency theory of organisations advanced by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
“organisational variables are in a complex interrelationship with one
another and with conditions in the environment.”
This model, as adapted by Miles and Snow (1978) and Burrell and Morgan (1979), cites five determining contingencies:
i The nature of the environment: simple, complex, stable or turbulent?
ii Strategic position: offensive or defensive?
iii Technological status: rigid or flexible?
iv Dominant culture: work ethos, core beliefs, etc.
v Organisational structure: bureaucratic, ad-hocracy, matrix, etc.
2.2.32 That these criteria are in a constant state of flux is apparent in the changes that private and public sector organisations are making to their structures and systems. A CIPD report on organisational development (1999a) found that 94% of the 153 companies surveyed were responding to external pressures by ‘rebranding’ and increasing the central control of their service image. Sixty-eight of the sample were public sector organisations, of these 60% are increasing central control over their business units. The survey also found that nearly all of the public sector companies in the survey were developing means of increasing accountability for performance down the organisation. Arkin (1999) notes, in relation to this CIPD report, that Andrew Kakabadse of the Cranfield School of Management explains this trend for recentralisation as part of a continual oscillation between central/local control systems, as firms search for competitive advantage.
2.2.33 The five contingent variables cited above (2.2.31) are clearly changing all the time. The purpose of management theory is to identify models that are sufficiently complex to recognise the multivariate nature of organisations; but sufficiently simple to be understood and implemented by managers. Critical to any such model is the purpose of the role of each individual within the organisation.
2.2.34 In order to capture the reality of Station Command any study must include an analysis of the purpose that the commanders believe they are there to achieve.
2.3 TIME USE / TIME MANAGEMENT
2.3.1 Whilst there is a wealth of literature dealing with time management, there is much less work on the converse of time management, time use. Sarah Cook (1999) has undertaken a meta-analysis of the inventories and self questionnaires used in the teaching of time management, she concludes that to be effective the practitioner must customise the time management principles, common to all of the packages (time/interruption logs, diary prioritisation, task batching, bring forward systems, etc.), to allow for the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the demands of the particular role.
2.3.2 This echoes the views of Potter (1994, 4) who argues that time management courses are effective in proportion to the recognition they give to the culture of the organisation and the individuals self-concept as a manager. Potter contends that time management courses are ineffective because they fail: “to change the way people see themselves and the belief systems under which they operate.” In particular he feels that this is because “We tend to copy the behaviours of those around us, particularly our bosses.” It is difficult to train an individual in time management, it is better to train a team or group so their behaviours reinforce each other.
2.3.3 Various systems are available to assist with time management, from paper based ‘diary’ systems of a type that is typically used by solicitor’s and accountants to sophisticated integrated IT systems. It appears to matter less which system is chosen than whether the system allows the organisation and its constituent individuals to operate in a manner they find acceptable.
2.3.4 Cole (1995) has studied managers attitudes to using and managing time. She found, in a survey of 1,259 managers, of these 95% of managers exceeded the average working week (40 hours per week). With 20% working more than 55 hours per week. The respondents felt that time pressures were increasing, but most held that they found prioritisation easy (91%) and they felt no pressing need for time management training (24% would like it, 44% see no need for it). The managers did identify that they benefited most from assistance in filing and administration and in filtering telephone calls, see page 79.
2.3.5 Garnett (1993) in a working time survey for the Industrial Society also looked at managers working time patterns. He found that 78% of the survey worked more than 40 hours per week, with 38% exceeding 50 hours per week. He notes a move toward shared secretarial support, 24% having their own secretarial support, 53% sharing such support and 21% having none. The survey indicated that 20% of managers working week was ‘wasted’. Telephone interruptions, people ‘dropping by’ and poor information exchange between departments were identified as the top three causes of wasted time.
2.3.6 Garnett’s survey also found that senior managers work an 11 hour day on average, the figure for middle managers being 9.25 hours per day. The corresponding figures for ‘paperwork’ are 3 hours per day (27%) for senior managers and 3 hours 11 minutes per day (33%) for middle managers, see page 81.
2.3.7 Stewart (1988, 5) identifies two main measures of a managers activities, the amount of time spent on an activity and the frequency of the activity. Her study of 160 line managers in 1967 identified some of their working patterns. She found that on average they worked a 42 hour week and spent an average of 66% of this time in verbal contact with other people: ranging from less than a third for ‘specialist’ mangers to 90% for some sales managers. They spent 75% of their time in their own ‘establishment’, 6% of their time on the telephone and, perhaps most importantly they averaged twelve ‘fleeting contacts’ (interruptions) per day and only two uninterrupted periods of half an hour or more per week.
2.3.8 Mintzberg (1973) referred to Stewart’s work, amongst others, when he examined the nature of managerial work and contended (p.10) that:
“managers work at an unrelenting pace, that their activities are characterised by brevity, variety and discontinuity, and that they are strongly oriented to action and dislike reflective activities.”
2.3.9 Mintzberg’s structured observation of chief executives found that they spent 59% of their time in scheduled meetings and a further 10% in unscheduled meetings; with desk work taking up 22% of their time and telephone calls accounting for another 6%. As important as the amount of time spent on each activity was the brevity of managerial activities, telephone calls lasted six minutes and desk work fifteen minutes on average. Half of the observed activities took less than nine minutes. His group spent even more time in oral communication (78%) than the managers in Stewart’s study.
2.3.10 Sayles (1979,17) posits three reasons why managers interact so much:
i Management is a contingency activity: managers act when routines break down.
ii Human needs of staff and colleagues: people in organisations demand contact.
iii Complexity: management issues are not reducible to equations.
When measuring the time use of managers it is important to establish what they, and their organisation, believe they should be doing with their time.
2.3.11 There is little published on the use of managerial time in the fire service. Time data is normally only collected in regard to fire safety inspections and operational attendance, neither of which gives insight into the managerial use of time. A study into flexible duty officer work trends (Tidbury, 2000) did indicate that Station Commanders call outs (when on-call but not at work) averaged 12 hours per month. This equated to four hours per month on operational incidents, four hours per month on investigation and welfare matters and four hours per month for ‘urgent managerial issues’.
2.3.12 McCreesh (1999) used a questionnaire based on the Management Charter Initiative criteria to identify the perceived time allocation of Station Commanders in West Yorkshire Fire Service. By self report these managers spent 46% of their time dealing with people, 11% dealing with Finance, 16% dealing with Operations and 27% with Information. [The comparator organisation, Tesco plc gave returns of 43% on ‘People’, 15% on Finance, 24% on Operations and 18% on Information.] There are no records of line managers actual working hours which, under the national scheme of conditions of service (1996 Section 2.5) applying to officers in the fire service, can vary from 42 to 48 hours per week with further periods ‘on-call’ for between 32 to 48 hours per week; the average ‘office hours’ for fire officers being 42 per week.
2.4 Working
Hours
2.4.1 This nominal average can be compared with the Office for National Statistics (1999) findings that full time male employees averaged a 45.8 hour week in 1998. The CIPD also produced a report on working hours (1999b). They defined ‘long hours’ as exceeding the Working Time regulations limit of 48 hours per week. Their study found that one in ten workers work long hours (>48p.w.) with one in twenty-five working more than 60 hours per week. Notably only 1% of the survey, of over one thousand workers, cited “fear of the sack” as the main reason for working long hours, 41% of the sample work longer hours on a purely voluntary basis. The average working hours of all workers in the CIPD survey were 38.9 hours per week. The figure for male workers is 45.5 hours per week which correlates closely with the ONS survey findings.
2.4.2 It can be concluded that time management is a learned, mechanical skill but actual time use is an amalgam of the individual managers skills, the nature of the managerial role, the culture and values of the organisation and the particular circumstances of the moment. These findings reflect Mintzberg’s four contingent variables of managerial work; (Environment, Job, Person and Situation).
Chapter 3
3 METHODOLOGY
Précis: The
methodological approach adopted for the study is described. The advantages of ‘triangulation’ -
examining complex systems with a variety of models – are discussed. The rationale is given for the choice of
research methods (a question set delivered via a structured interview and a
self reporting activity diary). The
findings of the pilot studies are outlined and the reasons why part of the
study had to be abandoned are given.
3.1 The focus of this research was to establish what station commanders spend their time doing, and whether or not this correlated with the purpose of their role. To achieve this it was necessary to get information on what the participants believed the purpose of their work to be, and of what they actually did with their time. The methodology for this research had to achieve these aims within the given time and resource constraints
3.2 The research design chosen for this study was ‘phenomenological’ rather than ‘positivist’, that is it sought to discover “the reality behind the reality” (Remenyi et al, 1998, 35;Thornhill et al, 2000, 85). Thus rather than seeking to establish by deduction if a hypothesis is true or not, it utilises an inductive approach, where the facts ascertained during the study lead to the development of theory to explain the observations. The study is both exploratory and explanatory (Thornhill, et al, 2000, 97). The aim is to find out what it is that commanders are doing (exploratory) and to establish the reasons why they are doing it (explanatory).
3.3 Bryman (1995, 28) distinguishes between ‘research design’ and ‘research methods’, noting that the former is “the overall structure and orientation of the investigation”. Once the research design had been determined the most appropriate research methods were identified. Bryman adds that although some designs are frequently associated with certain methods, e.g. case study with qualitative methods, the link is not implicit and several methods can be used in one design. Therefore although qualitative research is more usually seen as part of an inductive approach to investigation, (Thornhill, et al 2000, 91), it can be appropriate to use quantitative methods in an inductive study.
3.4 Management being a ‘contingency activity’ (see 2.2.13) cannot be fully understood using one type of analysis. Strati (2000, 160) explains this as ‘methodological triangulation’ where “the researcher does not rely on one single theory, one single method or on synchronic analysis alone, nor on one single set of data…in the course of empirical research.” This is echoed by Morgan (1997, 348); “there can be no (single) correct theory for …… everything we do.”, and reinforced by Thornhill, et al (2000, 86) who note: “Not only are business situations complex, they are unique. They are a function of a particular set of circumstances and individuals.” They go on to contend that it is not always possible or desirable to reduce everything to a series of law-like generalisations.
3.5 Given such complexity and uncertainty the following points must be considered when undertaking an analysis of an organisation:
i Can analysis of the findings be refined to produce generic models which can be used to assess organisations?
ii No one model is adequate to fully explain any organisation or system.
iii The analyst must be aware of the limitations of each model and the contradictions between models.
iv The analyst must be aware of their own inherent bias and that the data with which they are working will never be complete or exact.
3.6 The research method could not be based on a longitudinal study (Thornhill, et al, 2000, 96) as there was insufficient time available to collect both the initial and comparative data sets, and the existing secondary data was not sufficient to allow subsequent comparison to be made.
3.7 Strati (2000), p137 noted that structured observation allows theory to be developed inductively citing Mintzberg (1973), where three sets of data were collected regarding managerial activity:
i Data on the chronology of work activities
ii Data on mail received and sent
iii Data on relational activities (who was seen, where, for how long, etc.) from which Mintzberg inferred his contingency model of managerial activity. However, structured observation was found to be too time consuming and provided information on too small a sample to be effective for the purposes of this study.
3.8 Mintzberg (1973, 221-229) critiques seven research methods used to study managerial work. Table 2
|
Seven Methods of Managerial Study |
|
|
1 |
Secondary Data |
|
2 |
Interview and Questionnaire |
|
3 |
Critical Incident and Sequence of Episodes |
|
4 |
Diary |
|
5 |
Activity Sampling |
|
6 |
Unstructured Observation |
|
7 |
Structured Observation |
|
After Mintzberg (1973) |
|
All have their advantages and disadvantages, but the questionnaire and interview was seen as the most appropriate method to study the managers’ perception of their jobs. The use of diaries was seen as the best way of studying the characteristics of a large sample of managerial jobs. References were made to amount of information collected by large ‘diary’ studies, principally Carlson (1952) and Stewart (1967).
3.9 Bryman (1995, 227) notes “the ‘trade-off’ between the greater amount of information that can be supplied by observation studies and the larger number of individuals who can be accessed through the diary method”. These larger numbers allow a more reliable profile of station commanders’ activities to be constructed. Therefore it was decided to employ a hybrid study methodology. Using questionnaires to determine commanders perceptions of their role and self reporting diaries to capture the actual time use of commanders.
3.10 The role of the Station Commander is set by the organisation, but that role is effected by the individuals within that organisation Zey-Ferrel (1982,182) criticises the contingency approach of Mintzberg and others for ignoring this association. Amongst other criticisms she notes that this approach “considers people to be devoid of free will” and that such models “ascribe motivations and goals to organisations which only people can possess” . It is therefore from the individual’s interpretations of purpose and policy that we can interpret the working paradigms of an organisation.
3.11
To ensure such
‘individual’ interpretation of organisational intent was considered the study
methodology included questions designed to capture how the commanders felt
about what they were doing (beliefs and attitudes) as well as what they did
(behaviour) and what skills and training they had (attributes). This follows the model proposed by Dillman
(1978).
Table 3
|
Attribute |
‘Characteristics’ of a
respondent such as age, gender, training, job, etc. |
|
Belief |
Whether respondent
‘believes’ information to be true or false, no value judgement made. |
|
Attitude |
How a respondent
‘feels’ about an issue, a value judgement is made. |
|
Behaviour |
What a respondent
‘does’ in fact, as opposed to what they say they do. |
(See
Appendix II)
3.12 The
research objectives required that four questions be answered:
i What do station
commanders believe to be their role and purpose?
ii What
do they feel to be the key problems associated with the role?
iii What
support do they receive as managers?
iv How
do station commanders use their time?
To answer these questions
this research project adopted a questionnaire delivered in the form of a
structured interview to gather the data for the first three questions, and a self-reporting diary to gather the observational
data required by the fourth question.
3.13 To quote Robson (1993, 301) “the first phase
of any data gathering should, if at all possible, be a pilot study.”
Accordingly three Station Commanders within the author’s own
organisation were asked to ‘pilot’ both the diary and the questionnaire. As a result of their observations, and
further literature review, the diary was altered seven times and the
questionnaire ten times before the final versions were produced .
3.14 The key findings from these trials were:
§ The respondents would be far more receptive to keeping a diary if face to face contact was made. This personal contact was also found to be the preferred method as it was impractical to write a clear, concise, explanatory note for either the questionnaire or diary as they dealt with such complex issues.
§ The diary would not be effective if the attempt was made to capture information on too many variables. Similarly the diaries would not be workable unless they were simple to use. Therefore the diaries were designed to operate on a ‘page a day’ principle, and the variables were reduced to thirty-one (from sixty four in the initial trials).
§ The time periods for the diary could not be too fine. Traditionally professional diary systems use six or ten minute ‘slots’. The initial trials found this to be too intricate for the respondents. Therefore half hour ‘slots’ were selected as the ‘finest’ feasible gradation.
§ The respondents had to be assured of complete confidentiality and anonymity to ensure they felt able to answer fully, honestly and completely.
3.15 The outcome was a thirty question form designed to be completed during a structured interview (Appendix III), and a two week activity diary (Appendix IV). The form focused mainly on respondents attitude, attributes and beliefs, although some exploration of behaviour was included. The diary was almost completely behavioural.
3.16 A smaller questionnaire was also devised to elicit the management perspective on the two key questions of the structured interviews. [What is the purpose of Station Command and what priorities are placed on the functions of commanders.] These were left with the host Brigade during the visits.
3.17 This line of enquiry encountered two problems. Firstly, it proved very difficult to determine which officer in the host Brigade was the appropriate person to fill out the questionnaire. Clearly if it were given to the operations manager, for example, there would be a potential bias towards prioritising operational activities. Secondly, even when the appropriate individual could be identified, there was evidence of some uncertainty over role priorities. One form was returned with the remark that “ three senior officers have looked at this and cannot agree on the rankings. Therefore an average of the three scores has been given”.
3.18 Depending
upon the organisational structure of the Brigade it might prove necessary to
approach the Chief Fire Officer to get an unbiased view of a station commanders
priorities. It was decided to abandon
this line of enquiry for the purposes of this study – critical though it is to
an organisation’s effectiveness. This
is a worthwhile avenue of research that might be pursued at another time.
3.19 The credibility of any research relies on
the reliability and validity of the data gathered and the rigour of the
analysis. Robson (1995) discriminates
between external validity - can it be repeated by other researchers; and
internal validity – is the relationship between variables causal or
arbitrary? To ensure external validity
the diary was designed to have factors in common with other researchers
work. For example the method of
recording travel time was based on Stewart’s (1967) research allowing the
findings to be compared.
3.20
Sample
One of the critical factors affecting
external validity is the sample selection and sample size. The population of
Station Commanders in England is approximately 573 (DMG, 2000). Thornhill, et al (2000, 156) indicate that
for a population of this size a sample of 220 would be necessary for a 95%
confidence level. Given the financial
and time constraints of the research project it would be infeasible to attempt
such a large number of interviews other than through a postal survey. Bryman (1995, 113) comments that:
“there is a widespread
recognition amongst organisational researchers that investigations using sample
surveys are rarely based on probability samples.” He notes that ‘convenience sampling’ is more usual as it is the
sample that is actually available to the researchers.
3.21 The sample chosen was therefore
purposive; all the brigades approached
were in England, and homogeneous; all the respondents were station commanders.
The sample size was set at 60 UK and 3 Danish respondents. This more than meets the ‘rule’ of a minimum of thirty for statistical purposes
(Thornhill, et al 2000, 155). It also
represents 10% of the population of English station commanders. A variety of Brigades were approached by
writing to a principal officer. Arrangements
were made with those that replied until sixty respondents had been identified.
3.22
Practitioner-Research
There are advantages and
disadvantages attached to undertaking research as a
‘practitioner-researcher’ Although this
principally applies to one’s own organisation, the fact that this research was
carried out under the auspices of the Brigade Command Course raised similar
issues in the other Brigades visited.
As Strati (2000, 142) notes practitioner-researchers have an advantage
in that;
“There are activities which require specialist knowledge, the lack of which may render the analysis superficial; there are patterns of organisational life that are implicit; and there are organisational tasks which lie outside the range of permitted observation.”
3.23 However this knowledge and understanding which assists
practitioner-researchers in comprehending the organisation may also lead them
to miss, or misread, issues because they are culturally pre-conditioned,
(Thornhill, et al 2000, 224). In other
words aspects of the organisation which would be recognised by an ‘outsider’ as
anomalous can be accepted by a practitioner-researcher who has been
‘habituated’ to the circumstances. As
well as being aware of these dangers, the research findings can be fed back to
practitioner’s for ‘respondent validation’, (Bryman, 1995, 164). Consequently the initial findings were
relayed to two officers, one a principal officer the other a station commander,
for validation.
3.24 The data (from the questionnaires and diaries were entered into
spreadsheets. They were then analysed
using a variety of methods, qualitative answers were listed and studied using
category systems for key words (Robson, 1995, 275). Descriptive statistics were obtained using the Microsoft Excel
statistical functions.
3.25 Inferential
statistics were obtained using the ‘Statistica’ software programme. The t-test and the Wilcoxon Matched
pairs test (Robson, 1995, 353-5) were used to analyse the difference between
the priorities of the commanders and their Brigade’s priorities. To determine whether there was a
relationship between variables, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (R)
and Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) were used (Robson, 1995, 338).
3.26 These correlations indicate whether or not one variable is related to another, in
terms of:
Strength (R/r) , which can vary from –1 to 1 and thus be
negative or positive. This value is
the square root of the probability, thus if there was a correlation of 0.57
then the independent variable explains 32% (0.572) of the change in
the dependant variable.
Significance
(p), (set as p < 0.05), which
is a measure of how likely it is that the result is due to chance. For
non-parametric, or nominal scale data,
Spearman’s R was used. Most of
the data sets fell into this category.
Where one set of data was parametric and on an interval or ratio scale,
Pearson’s Coefficient was used to cross-check the Spearman test.
3.27 There were fifty-six respondents and one hundred and seventy variables, this provided 9,520 possible correlations. This number is a maximum, as only forty-two respondents returned diaries, the diary data (which has 38 variables) will be missing fourteen sets of data reducing the potential correlations by 532. Additionally, several of the questions have mutually exclusive answers, which means that some data sets cannot, by their nature, be complete.
3.28 Despite these reductions there were more available correlations than could reasonably be dealt with by a full, ordered review. Therefore, the correlational data was examined in two ways:
3.29 Any significant correlations were examined to see if they were meaningful, the focus was primarily on correlations between data from the attributes and questions and the diary data. This was to determine whether there are connections between respondents’ attitudes, attributes and beliefs and their actual behaviour.
3.30 Certain potential correlations derived from the research focus, will be examined to see if there is any significance in the relationship, (e.g. does a concern expressed in Q.2 over welfare correlate with the time spent by the respondents on welfare?). This second form of analysis is necessary because concentration on significant results only (whether positive or negative) would ignore the importance of there being no correlation where one might be expected
3.31 The analysed data were then critically evaluated and the findings are presented in chapter 5.
Chapter 4
4 INVESTIGATION
Précis: The
investigative process is outlined and the Brigades involved listed, the number
of respondents to the questionnaire and the diary are given.
4.1 The interviews for this research project were carried out between November 9th and December 22nd 2000. During this period arrangements were made to undertake structured interviews with 60 Station Commanders from sixteen English and two Danish brigades. Table 4