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Dowling,
D. (2002) Human Behaviour: Learned Irrelevance, www.fitting-in.com/dowling1.htm. |
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This
paper is intended to be thought provoking, provide a subject for debate and
give food for thought. The interpretation and further development is the
authors’ own thoughts and is not intended to reflect the view of any other
organisation. During the course of this short paper the
theory of ‘learned irrelevance’ will be introduced with an explanation of the
correlation between exposure to systems and the perception of risk. Further
clarification will be achieved with the association of a familiar experience.
This association will be related to domestic fire safety and finally identify
meaningful solutions to improve life safety in the home. |
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR: LEARNED
IRRELEVANCE
Dave M
Dowling MEd MIFireE MIMgt
Learned irrelevance
A paper entitled “A behavioural solution to the
learned irrelevance of emergency exit signage” (Mc Clintock, Shields,
Reinhardt-Rutland & Leslie 2001), introduces the results of research where
people recognise emergency exit signs, associate them with safety and that in everyday
conditions occupants tend not to recall the location of exit signs. The
research goes further to highlight the possible solutions that may be
introduced to interrupt learned irrelevance during emergency situations. The
understanding is that people are familiar with the signs and, because of this,
are not attracted by them in emergency situations. It is suggested that the
condition of signs should change in an emergency to attract peoples’ attention.
The paper was presented at
the 2nd International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire –
Understanding Human Behaviour for Better Fire Safety Design held in 2001 and is
published in the complete collection of the conference book produced by
Interscience Communications Ltd, Greenwich 020 8692 5050 - intercomm@dial.pipex.com.
Shops are typical of where
exit signs are common and yet seem insignificant. The customer is drawn by high
profile advertising campaigns and floor layout. The retailer is more interested
in keeping the customer in the shop rather than making the way out very clear -
retailers are required to satisfy legal requirements and it is often at the
minimum required standard.
The use of fire exit doors
may also be compared in a similar way and are also related to safety but do not
change condition, to attract attention, during an emergency situation. A
proposed definition for this theory may be described as
“familiarity with a system,
signal or equipment, which is designed for use in an emergency/critical
situation, resulting in inappropriate behaviour”
It may also be related to a
fire alarm which gives numerous false alarms causing occupants of a building to
develop a behaviour pattern where they delay their response whilst determining
the status of the signal.
Despite the proposed theory
of learned irrelevance, a contributory factor during an emergency situation is
a person’s decision-making process. This is where the occupant is likely to aim
to satisfy rather than optimise an escape plan. The different influences
include, time constraints, familiarity of environment and the perception of
risk.
Perception of risk
The theory of ‘learned
irrelevance’ may be further developed to explain that a if a person is
continuously exposed to something hazardous they may become familiar with the
environment, task or journey if no damage or injury is experienced - their
perception of risk is reduced. The boundaries may be pushed and short cuts
taken as the experience continues.
A paper entitled “Can
Personal Protective Clothing Influence the Risk-Taking Behaviour of
Firefighters?” (Woods 2001) describes research related to risk perception based
on the quality of the protection provided. Where there is continuous exposure
to an environment and no injury or damage is experienced it is likely that
people will become familiar and possibly complacent, developing a pattern of
learned irrelevance.
Learned Irrelevance can also
be used to explain why accidents occur in environments where people have most
experience, as they become more familiar with the surroundings. The Health
& Safety publication HSG45 entitled “Reducing error and influencing
behaviour” refers to ‘people factors’ and how they contribute to accident
causation. In similar situations to those described above, human error may be
related to ‘routine violations’ which is where “breaking the rule or procedure has become the normal way of working
within the work group”. An example may include failure to use a mechanical
guard where the process can be made faster and with less effort. In this case
the operator may have great experience of taking risk without suffering injury.
This will result in a lowered perception of risk, encouraging the potential of
further routine violation, which may inevitably result in some form of damage.
Routine violations have the potential to cause new work members to develop
similar bad habits demonstrated by longer serving employees. The introduction
of light beam sensors for safety cut outs and equipment guards is becoming more
common in an effort to reduce the potential for routine violations.
The previous definition of learned
irrelevance is further developed to encompass the aspects of how people behave
due to their experience in relation to risk and is described as
“Reducing perception of risk
through continuous exposure to an activity/environment, which does not involve
injury or significant damage”
This may also be related to accidents being a
more common occurrence in a familiar work place rather than in other more
hazardous and unusual environments.
Familiar experience
In an effort to highlight
the possible correlation between familiarity of exposure to systems and risks,
driving will be used as an example of how a person will behave despite the
obvious hazards. This scenario is common to most people and likely to be the
best vehicle for highlighting the association with the theory of ‘learned
irrelevance’. Certain trends in behaviour may be familiar to us or have been
witnessed and examples are presented below.
·
Some people tend not to wear
a seat belt especially if taking short journeys, especially in their local
area. Their perception of risk is probably low, possibly because they are
travelling at low speed, the journey is short presenting less perceived
hazards, and the area is familiar where accidents have not previously occurred.
The reality is that other drivers, who may not be in their local area or are on
a long journey, pose a hazard and the risk cannot be underestimated! According
to the police, most road traffic collisions [RTC’s] occur within three miles of
where a person lives and this is likely to be attributed to familiarity with
the environment.
·
It is becoming more common
to see people taking chances at red lights. This includes pushing through at
the last minute - the more people get away with this type of behaviour, the
more they will take the risk.
·
Another common sight on the
road is people using a mobile ‘phone whilst driving even though people
understand the risk, they still persist in the activity. Again, the more a
person takes a risk and gets away with it the more they are likely to develop a
habit. We understand the potential danger but ‘it won’t happen to me’!
·
According to the police,
speed is the greatest cause of death on the road and yet despite static/active
road signs and traffic calming measures, the problem persists.
The statistics available on
the DTLR web-site confirm that the number of fatal road traffic collisions is
relatively static at 3,500 per year. This is despite expensive media campaigns
(approximately £12million a year) and the continued increase of road users.
Specific factors may have an
influence on the behaviour of people when they are exposed to a potential
hazard. Here is a proposed list of factors, which may explain some of the
reasons why people take, or are exposed to, hazards and push boundaries because
of learned irrelevance.
Factors that may influence human behaviour whilst
driving a car.
Factor
|
Interpretation |
|
Experience – |
People who have proximity with an RTC may
be more aware of the potential outcome of taking risks. The lack of personal
experience or injury, despite awareness may not result in cautious behaviour. |
|
Education/awareness |
We are exposed to expensive seasonal media
campaigns and information is delivered to the public through tax renewal
notices, licence and vehicle changes, billboard notices etc. A great deal of
money is spent on raising awareness. Drivers receive training and have to
pass a test. |
|
Vulnerability |
Vulnerable road users may be classed as the
elderly and special needs, new and young drivers, people driving poorly
maintained vehicles, cyclists and motorcyclists and pedestrians. People with
cultural differences. |
|
Priorities |
Cost & time |
|
Passive/active systems |
Road signs, road markings, barriers,
traffic calming measures, traffic signals, speed cameras, seat belts, air
bags, side impact systems, roll cages etc. |
|
Authority |